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Decision-related regret is a negative emotion associated with thinking about a choice one has 
made or is about to make. Its focus may be the choice itself, the outcome of the choice, or the 
process leading to the choice. The thinking component in each case generally takes the form of a 
wish that things were otherwise, and involves a comparison of what actually did or will take 
place with some better alternative – a “counterfactual thought”. For pre-decisional (anticipated) 
regret, the thinking involves a mental simulation of the outcomes that might result from different 
choice options. Most research to date has focused on regret associated with decision outcomes, 
addressing especially (a) the comparison outcome selected and (b) whether or not the outcome 
was the result of action or inaction. More recent research has started to consider also the regret 
that may be associated with the choice itself, and with the decision process leading to that choice. 
Interest here has focused on the individual’s ability to justify the choice made or the process 
used. In this paper we review current research on decision-related regret and propose several 
directions for extending this research to cancer-related decisions.  
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REGRET IN CANCER-RELATED DECISIONS 
 
 Despite the everyday observation that decisions and their consequences are often the focus 
of a variety of intense emotions, most decision researchers have, until recently, largely omitted 
emotions from their models of the decision process. Feelings such as hope and dread may, of 
course, be associated with the assessment of the uncertain consequences of one’s choices; and 
the evaluation of decision outcomes is rooted in the feelings associated with experiencing those 
outcomes. For most decision researchers, however, the practice has been to fold these emotional 
issues into concepts of probability and utility and to examine primarily the cognitive and quasi-
rational aspects of decision making. Most studies of decision making have been studies of 
decision making thought, not of decision making affect. 
 The last decade has seen growing interest in the role of emotions in decisions (see 
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002, for 
partial reviews). Decision-related regret and related emotions such as disappointment (and their 
positive counterparts elation and rejoicing) have attracted considerable research interest, and no 
comprehensive survey of the literature is possible here. Instead we provide an illustrative 
sampling of the major issues and findings in regret research to date. Our special focus will be on 
decisions associated with cancer and its treatment, an area in which understanding the role of 
regret offers significant promise of illuminating the choice process and improving decision 
making. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review some of the main issues in 
research on decision-related regret, including a recent model with which we have been involved, 
Decision Justification Theory (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002), and some of the empirical 
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evidence associated with it. In the second part of the paper we outline several directions for 
future research on regret in decisions associated with cancer control and treatment. To date, little 
research has examined this issue (though see Clark, Wray, & Ashton, 2001; Hu, Kwan, Saigal, & 
Litwin, 2003; Montgomery et al, 1999; Payne, Biggs, Tran, Borgen, & Massie, 2000; and, for an 
example of research on the role of general affect in cancer-related decisions, see Schwartz, 
Peshkin, Tercyak, & Valdimarsdottir, this issue). This research has made important contributions 
by showing that regret can be an important consequence of decisions about cancer screening and 
treatment and by identifying some of the factors associated with such regrets. However, in our 
view, much is left to be learned about the role of regret in cancer-related decisions. 
 We interpret the term “decision” rather broadly here, to include action choices made after 
little or no deliberation as well as those to which the decision maker gives extensive thought. In 
the cancer context, for example, decisions on what course of treatment to follow (e.g. Kaplan, 
Ganiats, & Frosch, 2004) and whether or not to undergo a screening test (Briss et al, 2004) 
would typically involve conscious decisions taken after much thought and discussion. Action 
choices such as whether or not to smoke (Fuchs, 1974) or to comply with a difficult treatment 
regimen (Rachman & Eyrl, 1989) might, in contrast, result from momentary impulses and 
involve almost no conscious thought at all. It remains to be shown whether regret plays a similar 
role across this entire spectrum but, as a starting point, we will assume that it may be broadly 
involved. 
Different researchers have used very different definitions of the term “regret”, ranging from 
very broad (“a more or less painful cognitive and emotional state of feeling sorry for 
misfortunes, limitations, losses, transgressions, shortcomings, or mistakes”; Landman, 1993) to 
quite narrow (“a psychological reaction to making the wrong decision”; Bell, 1985). Most 
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definitions acknowledge (a) that regret is aversive and is avoided if possible; (b) that it involves 
an intimate interplay of thought and feeling; (c) that it is at least somewhat distinct from other 
specific emotions such as disappointment, and from general negative affect; and (d) that it 
involves a comparison of some event or process with another, better event or process that “might 
have been”. Our own usage corresponds closely to everyday English usage, and is typically 
operationalized as the response to a questionnaire item of the form “How much regret do you 
feel concerning [some event or process]”.  
MODELS OF REGRET 
Several economic choice theorists (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Savage, 1951) 
offered models of decision-related regret and experimental data in support of them. Much of this 
experimental work was later found to be flawed by a procedural artifact (Humphrey, 1995; 
Starmer & Sugden, 1993) and has largely been abandoned. Unfortunately one of the core ideas 
from these conceptualizations has crossed over into psychological research: the notion that regret 
is associated only with comparing an outcome with a better one that would have been received if 
one had made another choice. (Disappointment, in contrast, is thought to come from comparing 
one’s outcome with what one would have received if one had been luckier). According to this 
model a patient diagnosed with lung cancer might experience both regret for having smoked 
(comparing her actual illness with her presumed good health if she had decided not to smoke) 
and disappointment (comparing her actual illness to her luckier friends who smoked and did not 
contract cancer). Despite the intuitive appeal of these assertions, the only direct test of which we 
are aware (Connolly & Butler, 2004) fails to confirm them. As we will see below, the actual 
antecedents of regret and disappointment are more complex. 
Regret for Action versus Inaction 
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 Psychological interest in decisional regret was stimulated by an experiment by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1982), who asked participants to consider the feelings of two investors, each of 
whom loses a moderate amount of money when a particular stock declines. One investor had 
recently bought the stock, the other had simply retained it in his portfolio. A very large majority 
(92%, reported in Kahneman & Miller, 1986) judged that the active investor would feel more 
regret than would his passive counterpart. This result was interpreted as demonstrating an 
important general tendency: bad outcomes resulting from action are more regretted than similar 
outcomes resulting from inaction. 
The result attracted considerable interest, not least in studies of medical decisions, since it 
suggested that outcomes would be valued differently if they resulted from active intervention 
rather than from passive waiting. For example, Ritov and Baron (1990) reported evidence 
suggesting that parents would vaccinate their children only if risk of side-effects from the 
vaccine were markedly lower than risk of the disease against which it protects. Similarly 
respondents in Spranca, Minsk, and Baron (1991) reported that patients would choose surgery 
only if its risks were much less than the risk from the disease it was intended to cure. Baron 
proposed that these choices were distorted by a general tendency, which he labeled “omission 
bias”, and that this tendency may be driven by the regret differential associated with taking 
action. Such a bias would clearly be relevant to cancer decisions in such issues as passive 
watchful waiting versus a more active treatment (e.g., surgery) after diagnosis of early prostate 
cancer (Clark et al, 2003) or a positive genetic screening test result (Payne et al, 2000).  
 Recent evidence, however, raises serious doubts as to the existence of this bias (Connolly & 
Reb, 2003). The original finding that poor outcomes are regretted more when they result from 
action rather than from inaction has itself been brought into question (N’gbala & Branscombe, 
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1997). The action/inaction debate was further stimulated by the finding of Gilovich and Medvec 
(1995) that there may be a temporal reversal, with action more regretted in the short term, 
inaction in the longer term. Given the variety of cancer-related decisions in which treatment 
alternatives differ in the extent to which they involve active intervention, studies of possible 
patient bias against active treatments would appear to be an early research priority. 
Targets of Regret  
In addition to being a noun, “regret” is also a transitive verb: One typically regrets 
something. In the decision context we consider three possible types of regret, distinguished by 
their targets: 
1) Outcome regret, in which the target of regret is the outcome of a decision: “I regret that 
my cancer has recurred, or that I am experiencing residual pain from the surgery” (e.g., 
Payne et al, 2000). 
2)  Option regret, in which the target of regret is the decision alternative chosen: “I regret 
that I chose the treatment I did for my prostate cancer” (e.g., Hu et al, 2003). 
3) Process regret, in which the target of regret is the decision process preceding the choice: 
“I regret having made a hasty, ill-informed decision with regard to my treatment 
options”.  
In each case the regret may be actually experienced or anticipated ahead of time (and thus 
perhaps avoided). Regret scales currently used in assessing treatment-related regret in cancer 
patients (e.g. Brehaut et al, 2003; Clark et al, 2001) will need further development to reflect the 
multiplicity of regret types.  
Each type of regret will have its distinct antecedents and consequences, and one might 
experience one type but not another. One might, for example, regret having a recurrence of one’s 
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cancer without necessarily regretting one’s decision to forego adjuvant therapy, or regret having 
used a poor decision process while still feeling that the actual treatment choice was a good one. 
Sugden (1985) offers the example of a party-goer who drives himself home despite having had 
too much to drink, and makes the trip safely. Clearly he will not regret the good outcome but, 
Sugden suggests, may later be tortured with regret over his decision to drive. It is not clear how 
typical Sugden’s retrospectively self-critical party-goer really is. Considerable evidence suggests 
that only negative outcomes stimulate the search for causes and criticism of choices (Peeters & 
Czapinski, 1990; Taylor, 1991), while good outcomes tend to elicit little cognitive activity 1. 
There is good evidence that different types of regret are driven by quite different mechanisms. 
Outcome regret, for example, appears to rely primarily on comparison and reference effects of 
the sorts envisioned by the economic choice models, though the range of reference outcomes is 
much broader than the “outcome of foregone alternative” (OFA) those models generally assume. 
Mellers and her colleagues (Mellers, 2000; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999) have proposed an 
elegant model, Decision Affect Theory, that predicts outcome regret in a number of simple 
gambling choices, and provides a good fit to their data. Similar OFA effects have been 
demonstrated by Larrick and Boles (1995) in a negotiation context and by Zeelenberg and Pieters 
(2004) in real-world lottery-purchase decisions. Reference standards other than OFA have been 
demonstrated by Connolly, Ordóñez, and Coughlan (1997), where the participants’ pre-decision 
status quo was the salient referent; by Coughlan and Connolly (2001), where the expected 
outcome was salient; and by Ordóñez, Connolly, and Coughlan (2000), where the key referent 
was the outcomes received by others. The psychological mechanisms involved appear to be those 
of reference point theory and of counterfactual thinking research (Roese & Olsen, 1995). New 
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research will be needed to establish what reference states are commonly implicated when 
patients express regret at the outcomes of their cancer treatments. 
Regret and Justification 
In contrast to outcome regret, option and process regret appear to be more centrally 
concerned with mechanisms of self-criticism and justification, and we have labeled our 
theorizing on the subject “Decision Justification Theory” (DJT) (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002). 
The core idea of this theory is that, faced with a poor decision outcome, we tend to ask ourselves 
whether or not the decision, or the process that led up to it, was justified. If it was partially or 
entirely unjustified, we feel regret, the intensity of which is increased by the seriousness of the 
outcome.2 
Numerous studies illustrate this justification mechanism at work. For example, Simonson 
(1992) found that students who had been primed to think about regret were more likely to choose 
a name-brand product than a cheaper, unfamiliar one, and to take advantage of a current sale 
rather than wait on a later, possibly better one. The regret priming apparently led them to seek 
justifications for their choices, and thus to choose the safer brand and the guaranteed sale. Seta, 
McElroy, and Seta (2001) used the two-investors problem described above, (in which both lose 
money, one by holding a certain stock, the other by buying the same stock) but included brief 
personality descriptions of the protagonists. When the investor was described as a cautious risk-
avoider, the original results were replicated. However, when the investor was described as a bold 
risk-taker, more regret was expected for a bad outcome following inaction. Behaving in character 
thus appears to provide a justification for the investors’ behavior, and regret is reduced. 
Zeelenberg, van den Bos, van Dijk, and Pieters (2001), again following the action/inaction 
design, asked respondents to assess the regret a soccer coach would feel if his team lost after he 
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had either changed the team or kept it unchanged.  The results were contingent on the team’s 
prior record. If the team had been losing, a change was apparently seen as justified, and more 
regret was associated with inaction than with action. If the team had been winning change was 
unjustified, and more regret was expected from action than from inaction. Inman and Zeelenberg 
(2002) found similar results for consumers who changed brands and got poor results. Regret was 
substantially lower when experience with the original brand had been poor than when it had been 
good. The issue, clearly, is not simply action (change) or inaction (don’t change), but whether or 
not the change is justified by prior experience. 
 Measures of overall regret include mixtures of the three types of regret. Connolly et al. 
(1997) used a scenario in which three students end up in a mediocre course section after initial 
assignment to excellent, mediocre, or poor sections of the same course. In some conditions the 
students chose to make the change, in other conditions they are arbitrarily reassigned by a 
computer. Respondents expected that students who moved from the bad to the mediocre section 
would feel more rejoicing, and those who moved from the good to the mediocre section would 
feel more regret, than those who stayed put, though all three received the same outcome and 
knew of the same OFAs. The status quo was clearly the key referent.  Interestingly, respondents 
expected that even computer-assigned students who moved to a worse section would feel 
considerable regret (presumably outcome regret only, since they made no decision), though they 
expected those who made the choice for themselves would feel even more (presumably adding 
self-blame and thus process and/or option regret to their regret over the poor outcome). These 
findings provide strong support for DJT’s assertion of multiple independent components of 
anticipated regret. They also suggest that separate measures of each regret component may be 
 11
preferable in many studies to single, overall measures, since each component has different 
antecedents and consequences. 
 In a recent study we explored the joint effect of the normality (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) 
and of the justifiability (DJT) of the option chosen on anticipated regret. Results (Reb & 
Connolly, 2004) indicate that, when both justifiability and normality are specified, the effect of 
justifiability overwhelms that of normality. Regret is high when a poor outcome results from an 
abnormal process, but the effect disappears if the decision process is also described as careful 
and thorough (i.e. as justified). This finding suggests that the oncologist should take special care 
in explaining to patients the rationale justifying consideration of a novel (abnormal) treatment, to 
minimize possible option regret later. It also suggests that anti-smoking campaigns might 
usefully emphasize the unjustified (and thus regret-increasing) nature of the habit to counter the 
fact that smoking is still relatively commonplace (and thus normal, and regret-reducing). 
THE ROLE OF REGRET IN CANCER-RELATED DECISIONS 
Several studies have established that patients can feel substantial regret as a result of their 
cancer-related decisions (e.g., Hu, Kwan, Saigal, & Litwin, 2003; Montgomery et al, 1999). For 
example, Clark et al (2003) found that 16% of men who underwent treatment for early prostate 
cancer felt at least somewhat regretful about their treatment decision (and this result was 
independent of the type of treatment they chose). Clark et al (2001) found that 23% of men 
treated for metastatic prostate cancer with surgical or chemical castration expressed regret over 
their treatment decision. Payne et al (2000) found that 5% of women who had bilateral 
prophylactic mastectomy reported significant regrets. Post-decision regret is thus not unusual in 
cancer patients, suggesting that further research would be useful in this context. We propose 
several lines of research below.  
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1) Regret and persuasion.  Considerable research and applied effort has been devoted to 
persuading people either to desist from activities such as smoking that increase cancer risk or to 
engage in activities such as getting appropriate screening tests that reduce it. To the extent that 
these efforts have relied on emotions rather than on rational choice models, they seem to have 
involved mainly fear of the deleterious consequences. These fear messages appear to have had 
uneven success (Loewenstein et al, 2001). There may be potential in persuasive efforts based, 
instead, on evoking the regret one would feel if the bad outcome eventuates. For example, 
Richard, van der Pligt, and de Vries (1996) manipulated regret salience by changing time 
perspective. They asked respondents about either their feelings about unsafe sex or the feelings 
they would anticipate after having had unsafe sex. Participants in the second condition reported 
“safer” behavioral expectations immediately, and less risky sexual behavior in the five months 
following the experiment. Regret, as we have seen, includes both emotional and cognitive 
elements woven tightly together, so that an evocation of regret may be persuasive because it is 
immediately accompanied by thoughts of what might be done to reduce it. 
This line of research suggests studies that examine regret as an input to cancer-related 
decisions, especially with respect to decisions related to cancer prevention. Such research could 
manipulate regret salience, as Richard et al (1996) did, and measure the effect on cancer-related 
behaviors and decisions as compared to a control condition.  
2) Regret, justifiability, and vigilant decision making. Janis and Mann (1977) proposed that 
anticipated regret might serve to motivate attentive, thoughtful decision making based on 
improved information gathering and careful thought – what they referred to as “vigilant decision 
making”. The mechanism they proposed is very much along the lines sketched here: Anticipating 
the self-blame that will arise if a hasty, ill-considered decision were to lead to a bad outcome, the 
 13
decision maker turns instead to a more justifiable decision process, vigilant decision making, 
presumably improving her chances of a good outcome. There does not appear to have been any 
substantial research following up on Janis and Mann’s suggestion, but the idea seems to us 
highly promising. We should explore ways in which the possibility of post-decisional regret is 
made salient to the decision makers in time to affect their actual pre-decisional deliberations. 
Suggestion (1), above, proposed that anticipation of option regret might be useful in changing 
option choices. We hypothesize here that anticipation of process regret could lead to improved 
decision processes. 
In clinical practice, how careful a decision process is will often depend on the interaction 
between patient and physician. There is continuing interest in alternative models of involving 
patients and physicians in treatment-related decisions (Frosch & Kaplan, 1999). Common 
arguments for significant patient involvement include improved quality of choices and stronger 
patient commitment to carrying through with the chosen treatment. In addition, such involvement 
may increase perceived justifiability of the decision process, thus helping to reduce post-decision 
regret when outcomes are poor (Connolly & Reb, 2001). However, more patient involvement 
might imply stronger self-blame in case of a bad outcome, leading to more regret (Sheridan, 
Harris, & Woolf, 2004). Empirical studies will be needed to establish an appropriate balance.  
Some evidence from cancer research suggests the importance of careful, well-informed 
patient decision-making. Clark et al (2001) found that among men treated for metastatic prostate 
cancer those who expressed regret more were more dissatisfied with their role in the decision 
making process, thought they had received less information than they needed, and were more 
likely to feel that they did not have much of a choice. Hu et al (2003) found that less educated 
men were more regretful about their localized prostate cancer treatment decisions. It is unclear 
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whether these men were poorly informed about their treatment options or were unable to fully 
use the information they were given, but they do appear to have felt in hindsight that their 
treatment decisions were inadequately justified.  
We suggest that research should further explore how aspects of the decision process (e.g., 
amount of information gathered) affect later regret in cancer patients. More research is needed, 
especially addressing individual variations in these appropriateness judgments and how feasible 
the decision processes that patients see as appropriate are in the world of busy physicians and 
technically complex diagnostic and treatment options. (See Schwartz et al, this volume, for an 
example of complex decisions associated with genetic testing and cancer prophylaxis). In 
addition, experimental research should manipulate the salience of decision process regret and 
examine the effects on the decision process, decision quality, and satisfaction with decision 
consequences. 
3) “Regret therapy / management”. Regret is often experienced as both painful and long-
lasting (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). Benjamin Franklin, who lost a favorite four-year-old son to 
smallpox after neglecting to have him vaccinated against the disease, reports sadly that, even 
decades later, he could not think of the boy “without a sigh” (Issacson, 2003). It is possible that 
such persistent distress might contribute to depression and associated ill-health and poor quality 
of life. Regret about treatment decisions was associated with worse current health-related quality 
of life in men with localized prostate cancer (Hu et al, 2003) and to worse generic and prostate-
cancer related quality of life and emotional well-being in men treated for metastatic prostate 
cancer (Clark et al, 2001), although the causal direction of the relationships found in these 
studies remains uncertain.  
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The model of regret outlined here provides straightforward suggestions for a therapeutic 
model for regret reduction. For outcome regret, develop alternative, less damaging reference 
comparisons; for process and option regret, develop better justifications. Researchers could 
identify the reference comparisons and self-blame of patients with regrets and test whether 
interventions aimed to introduce regret-reducing reference comparisons and justifications do, in 
fact, reduce regret and improve health-related quality of life.   
There is some evidence that many people may actually be quite good at “managing their 
regrets”. Bonadona et al (2002) interviewed cancer patients who received a positive test result of 
genetic cancer susceptibility. While 8 out of 19 participants thought that the disadvantages of 
knowing their genetic status outweighed the benefits, only 1 person expressed regret about 
having undergone genetic testing. Similarly, Di Prospero et al (2001) found that although most of 
their 24 participants who had undergone genetic breast cancer screening reported a significant 
increase in worries and cancer risk perception, none regretted their decision to undergo 
screening. These results may be in part at least caused by patients’ perception that they “did the 
right thing” to undergo screening. Winer et al (1993) found that among women with a history of 
breast cancer who had undergone breast reconstruction with silicone implants, 34% said they 
would now be completely unlikely to choose silicon implants (and only 27% now would be 
completely likely to choose them), but only 16% reported regrets about the reconstruction. It 
would be interesting to learn whether, in cases such as these, most patients never experience 
regret or do initially experience regret but learn to manage it.  
3.Misprediction of regret. There is good evidence that decisions can be influenced by anticipations 
of regret, but there is little evidence as to how accurate these anticipations will be. The findings 
of Crawford, McConnell, Lewis, and Sherman (2002) suggest that they may be seriously in 
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error. Several lines of research (e.g. Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-Bulman, 1978; Loewenstein, 
1987) suggest that our ability to make predictions of our future emotional states, including 
regret (Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, & Wilson, 2004) is often poor. It is thus likely that, in 
extended sequences of related decisions such as those often needed in cancer care, complex 
interactions will arise between regret anticipation that influences earlier decisions, experience 
of actual regret resulting from those decisions, and anticipations of regret during subsequent 
decisions. For research on cancer-related decisions, this means that in addition to measuring 
experienced (and expressed) regret after the decision consequences have materialized 
researchers need also to measure decision makers’ predictions of regret before the choice and 
before outcomes are received. While such repeated measurement would obviously make data 
collection more difficult, it offers a better understanding of the relation between experienced 
and anticipated regret in complex decisions. 
 The studies sketched in the preceding paragraphs do not appear to pose any unusual 
methodological challenges. Measurement of the core construct, regret (both experienced and 
anticipated), has so far mainly relied on simple one- and two-item scales. More sophisticated 
measures may eventually be needed, but simple scales have obvious appeal at the present early 
stage of the work. Recent studies in the DJT tradition have moved from single, overall 
measures of regret to pay closer attention to the focus of what is regretted, distinguishing 
process, option, and outcome components, again using simple scales. Particular studies will, of 
course, pose their own specific problems of sampling, timing and experimental design, but 
none that are uniquely associated with including regret ideas. The studies proposed here are 
essentially straightforward extensions of existing studies of patient and physician decision 
making, to include new concepts and measures related to regret. Studies of decisions, either 
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prospective or retrospective, commonly involve consideration of the decision processes used, 
the options selected, and the consequences of these choices. Regret theory in general, and DJT 
in particular, aims to extend these considerations to include possible regret as an important 
aspect of each of these aspects of decision. The work thus extends, rather than supplanting, 
existing conceptualization and methodology.  
CONCLUSION 
Decision-related regret is currently a very active research field. In the last few years it has 
made considerable progress, both theoretically and empirically, and promises to develop rapidly. 
There seems to be every prospect that this progress will open up fruitful opportunities for 
research and application in cancer-related decisions. In our reading research on regret in cancer-
related decisions has relied mostly on survey studies of experienced regret. Additional research 
should examine on the role of anticipated regret in cancer-related decisions. We believe that the 
research directions outlined above could lead to significant advances in our understanding of the 
relation between cancer-related decisions and regret and ultimately help people make better 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. A reviewer of an earlier draft suggests the important and plausible hypothesis that 
outcome regret is a prerequisite for the experience of either process or option regret.  
2.  A reviewer points out the links to existing theorizing such as dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 1997) and self-regulation theory (Cameron & Leventhal, 2003). We agree, 
but have chosen for reasons of length not to develop these theoretical issues here. 
 
 
  
